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Provisions for the poor have always been a contentious political issue in
the U.S. For good reason. Welfare policy engages conflicting economic
interests, clashing worldviews, competing social needs. Critical analyses of
social welfare practice have centered on the ways that policies function to
regulate the labor market and to preserve social order and discipline. In
this approach, conflicts and interests structured by class and race take
center stage.' Recently, feminist scholars have argued that social welfare
policy also reflects structures of gender inequality.' This paper engages
the theoretical debate by examining the latest "welfare reform" initiative,
the Family Support Act of 1988.' But this paper also has a practical polit-
ical purpose: to offer a strategy toward welfare policy that promotes
women's independence as individuals and supports them as mothers.
The centerpiece of the Family Support Act is its expanded work re-
quirements for single mothers with young children. Its passage represents
a significant shift in the liberal position on welfare policy, since conserva-
tives have always favored programs in which mothers are required either
to find work or to work in exchange for welfare benefits. In the past,
liberals opposed these "workfare" programs but supported voluntary
training and work experience programs that would help mothers become
self-supporting once their children reached school-age. Since 1971, Con-
gress has required the states to register women with school-age children in
training, work experience, or job search programs." But until now, women
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with children under six have generally been exempt from these require-
ments. The new law requires states to enroll mothers with children over
three years old in training, work experience, and job search programs and
allows states to make participation in such programs mandatory for
mothers of children as young as one year old."
Advocates of the Family Support Act argue that it will cut the welfare
rolls and end poverty by making single mothers "self-sufficient." But the
Family Support Act is no more likely to cure poverty than previous wel-
fare reforms. Indeed, welfare families' conditions of life will continue to
deteriorate, since cash benefits are very low and not indexed for inflation
(unlike, for instance, social security). Benefit levels in most states are,
and will no doubt remain, well below the poverty line, because the Family
Support Act does not set a federal minimum benefit standard.8 Indeed, a
federal minimum benefit was never seriously considered in the discussion
of welfare reform.9 Few welfare recipients remain on welfare for long
periods and many already leave welfare for paid work.10 However, they
remain poor, because their low-paid jobs do not cover their job-related
expenses (e.g., transportation, childcare) or health-care needs.1 And fully
40% of all women who leave welfare with an earnings increase eventually
like New York registered very few mothers, whereas Utah forced most to register for the program.
Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249,
1262-63 (1983). However, even after 1971, most of the Work Incentive Programs were funded at
levels too low to accommodate all recipients. Although the state must register all recipients, programs
have tended to serve the most employable recipients who need the least services: men, women with
older children who do not require childcare or after-school care, and volunteers. Handler, The Femi-
nization of Poverty and the Malenization of AFDC, N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming
1989) (manuscript on file with author).
5. The original House bill, H.R. 1720, the Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, also exempted
women with children under six. However, it was amended in the House Ways and Means Committee
to require participation by women with children aged three years or older, and to allow states to
require mothers of children one year or more to participate. Mothers of children less than six could
not be required to participate in work or training more than 20 hours per week and only when
childcare was provided.
6. The Family Support Act does, however, limit their required participation in training or wage
work to 20 hours per week. For a description of the shifting liberal position and emerging consensus,
see Reischauer, Welfare Reform: Will Consensus Be Enough?, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1987, at 3.
7. Rovner, Welfare Reform: The Next Domestic Priority?, 44 CONG. Q. 2281, 2283 (1986).
8. Combined welfare and food stamp benefits still leave recipients substantially below subsistence
in almost four-fifths of the states. Sklar, Welfare Reform and Youth Unemployment Policy Options,
11 AM. FAM. 9, 11 (1988).
9. Opposition to a national benefit standard was almost universal in the Congress, except for a
handful of liberal democrats. See Moynihan, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1987, at A26,
col. 4.
10. More than 50% of single mothers leave welfare within two years and only 17% stay on wel-
fare for more than eight. Roughly 21% of eligible single mothers leave welfare for paid work. Nichols-
Casebolt & McClure, Social Work Support for Welfare Reform: The Latest Surrender in the War on
Poverty, 34 Soc. WORK: J. NAT'L A. Soc. WORKERS 77, 78 (1989).
11. Almost two-thirds of households in poverty receive no cash assistance at all; over 40% do not
receive any means-tested benefits. Handler, supra note 4, at 13. In 1985, 41.5% of the poor popula-
tion over fifteen years old were working. Rovner, supra note 7, at 2283.
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return.12 To really end poverty for working single mothers requires de-
cently paid jobs, affordable quality health care and childcare.
Many critics of the Family Support Act argue that its major thrust is
not to improve the lives of poor women but to reduce welfare expenses
and welfare rolls by making welfare increasingly less attractive as an al-
ternative to low-paid work and by making fewer people eligible for assis-
tance. Promises that single mothers will get real skills or training will not
be fulfilled, critics predict. Instead, states will offer only minimal services
to welfare recipients, who will be forced to work at minimum-wage ser-
vice sector and manufacturing jobs, filling the labor needs of local employ-
ers.18 They have a point. All previous experience with "welfare to work"
programs demonstrates that high-quality programs are very expensive and
reduce costs only over the long term.1 ' Thus, whatever the reform
promises, programs are likely to be underfunded and in practice end up
doing little to reduce the caseload or increase the skills and education of
recipients.1
Feminists have been divided over the issues raised by the Family Sup-
port Act. In the debates leading up to passage of the Act, most agreed
with the critics, but they disagreed about the alternatives feminists ought
to support. Some argued against the goal of making single mothers eco-
nomically "self-sufficient." The proposed reforms, they argued, would
leave single mothers even worse off. Poor women would be forced to put
their children in inadequate daycare while they worked at dead-end, low-
paid jobs. These feminists assert the value of women's work as mothers
and defend their entitlement to state support.1 ' They consider it a mistake
for women to embrace male-defined notions of "independence." Men, they
point out, are not really "independent," for they "depend" on women's
unpaid labor in the home to care for them and for their children. More-
over, they note that while poor women on welfare are stigmatized for fail-
ing to be "self-sufficient," it is perfectly acceptable for married women to
"choose" full-time motherhood and dependence on their husbands over
wage work.1 7
12. M. BANE & D. ELLWOOD, THE DYNAMICS OF DEPENDENCE: THE ROUTES TO SELF SUFFI-
CIENCY (1983).
13. See Ransby, AGENDA, Dec. 1988, at 3; Handler, supra note 4, at 121-25.
14. For a review of "welfare-to-work" programs, see Y. HASENFELD, WELFARE AND WORK:
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MORAL AMBIGUITY 39-56 (U. of Cal. Institute of Industrial Rela-
tions Working Paper No. 147, 1987).
15. California's GAIN, one of the model programs for the Family Support Act, was projected to
remove no more than 3% of the caseload from the welfare rolls. A national review of welfare-to-work
programs found that more than 50% of those recipients who found work had to remain on welfare
because their wages were so low. Udesky, Workfare: It Isn't Fair and It Doesn't Work, 51 THE
PROGRESSIVE 14 (1987).
16. Sarvasy, Reagan and Low-Income Mothers: A Feminist Recasting of the Debate, in REMAK-
ING THE WELFARE STATE: RETRENCHMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA AND EUROPE (M.
Brown ed. 1988) [hereinafter REMAKING THE WELFARE STATE].
17. Gordon, supra note 2.
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Other feminists, who recognized the limitations of the reforms being
debated, nonetheless argued for proposed legislation providing the most
benefits, protections, and services (education, job training, childcare) to
help women on welfare enter paid work.'" "Marriage to the state," they
asserted, is no better than dependence on husbands for economic support.
The "motherhood mystique" ("children need mother's care . women are
natural caregivers") could be used to legitimate single mothers' claim to
income from the state. 9 But by defining women primarily as caregivers,
the "motherhood mystique" also perpetuates the gender division of labor
in the family, encourages women's reliance on men for economic support
and justifies discrimination against women in paid employment.2
Feminist differences on welfare policy reflect a real, sometimes seem-
ingly intractable, difficulty that characterizes many feminist reform ef-
forts: The conflict between a "politics of equality" and "a politics of dif-
ference." I'll argue that this counterposition is not inevitable, and that it is
possible to craft a strategy that combines both.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The most interesting feminist work on the welfare state has analyzed
state policy in terms of the intersection of capitalism and patriarchy."
The state, it is argued, mediates between competing needs of capital-for
women's low-waged labor on the one hand and for women's unpaid do-
mestic labor on the other-and the interests of men. The rise of industrial
capitalism threatened men's control over women by undermining the eco-
nomic and political basis of male authority within the family. At the same
time, the employment of women threatened the adequate reproduction of
wage labor. On the other hand, to subsidize women's reproductive labor
through the state threatened male control over women within the fam-
ily-by offering women an alternative to dependence on a male breadwin-
ner-and undercut the availability of women, particularly working-class
women and women of color, as a low-waged labor force for capitalist em-
ployers. Tracing the history of welfare policy, Mimi Abramovitz argues
that distinctions between "deserving" and "undeserving" women have al-
18. NAT'L COALITION ON WOMEN, WORK & WELFARE REFORM, CHANGING WELFARE: AN
INVESTMENT IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN POVERTY (1987).
19. On the "motherhood mystique," see Hoffnung, Motherhood: Contemporary Conflict for
Women, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 157 (J. Freeman ed., 4th ed. 1989).
20. Hartmann, Changes in Women's Economic and Family Roles in Post-World War II United
States, in WOMEN, HOUSEHOLDS, AND THE ECONOMY 33, 58 (L. Beneria & C. Stimpson eds. 1987).
21. See M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2; Pascall, supra note 2; M. BARRETT, WOMEN'S OPPRFS-
SION TODAY (rev. ed. 1988); E. WILSON, WOMEN & THE WELFARE STATE (1977); Boris & Bardag-
lio, The Transformation of Patriarchy: The Historic Role of the State, in FAMILIES, POLITICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE 132 (1. Diamond ed. 1987);
McIntosh, The State and the Oppression of Women, in FEMINISM AND MATERIALISM: WOMEN AND
MODES OF PRODUCTION 254 (A. Kuhn & A. Wolpe eds. 1978); Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare
State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 231 (A. Gutmann ed. 1988).
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lowed the state to support some women who followed the dominant family
ethic-those who were widowed or caring for injured or sick hus-
bands-while excluding others-those who appeared to "choose" single
motherhood. Similarly, local control over eligibility and benefit levels has
been used to force working-class women, and especially women of color,
into paid work where local industries rely on their low-paid labor.2" In
general, Abramovitz says, welfare policy has balanced competing needs by
allowing some mothers to support themselves outside the labor market and
the male breadwinner family, while forcing many others into wage work
in the lowest paid and least secure jobs and ultimately back into marriage.
Feminists have also argued that in addition to class and gender, racial
inequality has structured welfare policy, particularly in the ways it differ-
entiates among women-women of color are more likely than white
women to be defined as "undeserving."2
While this body of work has laid a foundation on which to build, the
capitalist-patriarchy approach has not sufficiently recognized that welfare
state policy toward single mothers has had a contradictory rather than
unitary impact and that women have been agents as well as victims in its
creation and implementation. The establishment and expansion of state
support to single mothers reflected the political organization of women,
not only the actions and interests of men or capitalist employers. And the
growth of the welfare state after World War II tremendously enlarged
women's alternatives to dependence on men by increasing women's em-
ployment and providing services which, however minimal, are far better
than those previously available.24 True, the miserly benefits, demeaning
rules and regulations, harassment and surveillance by caseworkers dimin-
ish the attraction of welfare as an alternative to the male breadwinner
family, even for those women who are deemed eligible for benefits. True,
also, that white, middle-class women active in lobbying for welfare legisla-
tion have often failed to represent the interests and needs of the working-
class women and women of color in whose names they claim to speak.
Nonetheless, welfare policy has tended to undermine the male breadwin-
ner family, rather than simply upholding it. Such contradictory outcomes
challenge an explanation of welfare policy in terms of its function for
reproducing either capitalism or male domination.25 An analysis of the
22. M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2 passim.
23. Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race and the Origins of the American Welfare
State, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE (L. Gordon ed.) (forthcoming 1989).
24. Pateman, supra note 21, at 255-58.
25. Hasenfeld makes a similar point with regard to workfare programs in particular. Against
those who analyze workfare as a mechanism of labor supply regulation and social control, he argues
that these programs are expensive, hard to administer and generally ineffective. Since there are better
and cheaper ways to achieve the same ends, the programs have to be explained in other terms-in his
view, the "moral ambiguity" in cultural values and norms about welfare and work. Hasenfeld, supra
note 14.
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political process through which welfare legislation was passed also raises
questions about the adequacy of this theory.
For instance, among the many groups testifying to Congress for or
against the welfare reform bills, there were only a handful of business
organizations-the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Busi-
ness Alliance, as well as some individual businesses. 6 Moreover, none of
the major corporate think-tanks, such as the Committee for Economic De-
velopment or the Conference Board, has issued a policy statement on wel-
fare within the last six years.27 The prominent voices among those advo-
cating reform before Congress belong to social service administrators, state
and local government executives, charitable organizations, social service
professionals and lobbies for the poor.28
Federal government policy toward single mothers reflects diverse pres-
sures: middle-class reformers (such as church-affiliated activists, volun-
teers in charitable organizations, political party activists) and growing
numbers of service professionals who argue the need to provide for the
poor in order to prevent class polarization and unrest and to ensure the
reproduction of skilled and socialized worker/citizens; federal government
administrators interested in maintaining social order, economic prosperity
and the legitimacy of the party in power; politicians looking for re-
election; political organizations representing workers and subordinated
groups, such as trade unions, civil rights organizations and women's orga-
nizations; sometimes explosive political and social movements of the poor;
special interest business groups; and state and local governments anxious
26. CIS/ANNUAL 1988 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF U.S. PUBLIC LAW 464-75. Interestingly,
their testimony primarily opposed mandatory work requirements for welfare recipients and instead
supported training and job placement programs with voluntary participation. Unlike the ideological
conservatives, these groups seem less concerned about curing a "pathology of dependence" through
forced work and more interested in state programs that are directly crafted to subsidize employment of
the more able and willing welfare recipients in low-waged local industry. The proposed legislation
continued or expanded programs that pay employers to hire and train welfare recipients and allow
low-paid workers to continue receipt of benefits. On the other hand, they considered as unrealistic
proposals to establish a minimum national benefit or move the "hard to employ" recipients into work,
because that would require excessive levels of spending. See, e.g., Hearings on Welfare Reform: H.R.
30 Fair Work Opportunities Act of 1987 and H.R. 1720 Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987,
100th Cong., 1st Sess, 252 (1987) (testimony of William Kohlberg, President, National Business
Alliance).
27. On the other hand, a broad array of initiatives on welfare reform were taken by others in the
period leading up to the introduction of legislation. Major actors were government officials, policy
institutes, and foundations. They included: the "Matter of Commitment Project" of the American
Public Welfare Association (an organization of state human service commissioners); the National
Governors' Association Task Force on Welfare Prevention; Governor Cuomo's Task Force on Poverty
and Welfare; the Project on the Welfare of Families, chaired by Bruce Babbitt and Arthur Fleming;
the Ford Foundation (which funded several different projects, including a Project on Social Welfare
and the American Future); the Brookings Institution; the Urban Institute; and, for the conservatives,
the White House Domestic Policy Council and the Working Seminar on the Family and American
Welfare Policy, staffed by the American Enterprise Institute. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, NA-
TIONAL WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVES (1986).
28. Work, Education, and Training Opportunities for Welfare Recipients: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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to reduce their own costs by transferring them to the federal level or re-
sisting federally mandated expansions. The history of welfare policy since
World War II reflects this diversity of interests and the shifting political
coalitions among them.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) offers one example
of how political coalitions shape welfare policy. While the value of AFDC
benefits delined in the 1970's, in-kind benefits, particularly food stamps
and medical care, increased. While popular attitudes toward welfare are
generally negative, voters tend to prefer in-kind benefits to cash handouts.
Gender ideology also shapes popular preferences for in-kind programs.
Cash grants replace wages and are typical of programs developed for men,
such as unemployment insurance, whereas in-kind grants allow the donor
to retain control over the behavior of the recipient and are more common
in programs developed for women."' Most important, however, in-kind
programs are vigorously supported by provider groups with political re-
sources, such as farm organizations, construction and real estate indus-
tries, hospitals and the American Medical Association."0
The capitalist state is an arena of political struggle for all kinds of or-
ganized groups; policy outcomes, shaped by an historically determined
balance of forces, are almost always double-edged. There are instances, of
course, where organizations representing capitalist employers directly en-
gage in the policy-making process and wield considerable influence over
the outcome. And at times, male-dominated organizations such as skilled
trade unions or professional associations have attempted to use the state to
exclude women from their occupations or to otherwise protect male privi-
lege in the labor market. But very often-and this is the case with regard
to state policy toward single mothers-the politically organized groups in-
volved in fighting over policy and the issues that engage them do not re-
veal direct intentional intervention by capitalist employers as a group.
Moreover, the major proponents of legislation often are not men but
women. Welfare policy reflects structures of class and gender, but not be-
cause the state functions to reconcile the interests of men with those of
29. For a discussion of the ways that gender ideology is expressed in the differences between
welfare state programs directed toward men and toward women, see M. ABRAMOVITz, supra note 2
passim; Law, supra note 4 passim; Nelson, The Gender, Race, and Class Origins of Early Welfare
Policy and the U.S. Welfare State: A Comparison of Workmen's Compensation and Mothers' Aid, in
WOMEN, CHANGE, AND POLITICS (L. Tilly & P. Gurin eds. 1989).
30. The National Association of Homebuilders, long an opponent of federal social welfare initia-
tives, emerged in the 1960's as a major source of support for housing subsidy measures. See L.
SALAMON, WELFARE: THE ELUSIVE CONSENSUS 90 (1978). Similarly, the growing and well-
organized lobbies of childcare providers have helped to put work plus childcare on the agenda for
welfare reform. Although organizations such as the National Association for the Education of Young
Children have focused on the various bills expanding the federal government role in childcare, they
support any increase in federal payments for childeare services, including in welfare programs. Their
efforts have helped not only to legitimate daycare and to undermine conservative opposition to a fed-
eral government role in childcare, but also to impress upon Congress the broad constituency for sup-
port to working mothers.
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capitalist employers. Rather, welfare policy is shaped by class and gender,
because the class structure and the social organization of gender set limits
to and create opportunities for those particular interest groups who at any
given time participate in the policy-making process. This process of set-
ting limits and creating opportunities occurs both outside and inside the
political process itself. In the capitalist economy, investment decisions are
privately controlled and primarily determined by profitability. Conse-
quently, state policies which threaten or appear to threaten profit levels,
by undermining work incentives, redistributing income and wealth, or cut-
ting too deeply into profits through taxation, will trigger reduced invest-
ment, capital outflows, lowered exchange rates, and other responses that
can lead to an economic downturn. Capitalist class interests are imbedded
in the imperatives of the capitalist economy. These imperatives set the
context within which decisions about taxation and spending must be
made, and they operate regardless of who holds office or directly controls
government decision-making. Further, interest groups contesting state pol-
icies seek political goals and rhetoric that are realistic and will tend to
limit themselves to policies compatible with a "positive business climate."
In this way, the post-war era of prosperity and growth did not create the
expansion of the welfare state, but made it possible. The qualitative
changes in the scope and level of government spending reflected the politi-
cal organization of different interest groups and most spectacularly the
Civil Rights movement of the early 1960's. But the way the political sys-
tem responded to the mobilization of this new constituency also depended
on the opportunities provided by an expanding and prosperous economy.
Correlatively, economic decline and the end of the era of growth did not
create the conservative backlash, but undermined the political economy on
which the welfare state had been based. Increasing conflicts over shrink-
ing political and economic resources drove a broad wedge into the coali-
tion of interests that had constituted the base of post-war liberalism.
Women's self-organization as a political force has varied in time and by
class over the period during which the modern welfare state and social
policy has been constructed. We cannot understand the evolution of state
policy apart from an account of the presence and absence of women in the
political process. For example, white, middle-class women's organizations
played a crucial role in the passage of income-maintenance, public health,
and other social legislation in the Progressive period but not during the
New Deal.8" And it was not until the 1960's that poor women, particu-
31. On the impact of the "Women's Lobby" on federal legislation in the early 1920's, see Muel-
ler, The Empowerment of Women: Polling and the Women's Voting Bloc, in THE POLITICS OF THE
GENDER GAP 16, 18-21 (C. Mueller ed. 1988). For the New Deal period, see S. WARE, BEYOND
SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL (1981). A "women's network" wielded influence within the
New Deal administration, but there was no significant mass mobilization of women as there had been
during the Progressive Era.
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larly Black women who were the clients of welfare programs, organized
themselves to contest social policy. To understand not only when women
mobilized, but also which women mobilized and for what ends, and with
what strategies and political rhetoric, requires an analysis of the changing
social organization of gender and especially the sexual division of labor
within the household and the economy. Responsibility for caretaking as
unpaid work within private households has been both a political resource
and a disadvantage for women. And the changing circumstances under
which women take up this responsibility explains both their self-
organization and their political marginalization.3 2
The next section will review the history of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) and the context of the current welfare reform,
showing how changes in the capitalist economy, and in gender relations,
shaped policy outcomes."3 The last section of this paper will discuss femi-
nist responses to the Family Support Act of 1988.
CLASS AND GENDER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WELFARE POLICY
Until the early twentieth century, it was common for children of poor
single women to be removed from their mothers' care. Between 1911 and
1921, forty states enacted legislation that allowed local authorities to award
grants to those destitute single mothers who were considered to be "proper
guardians," so that the family could stay together. Many women reform-
ers rationalized the idea of mothers' pensions in terms of children's need
for their mothers' care: state support would make it possible for poor
women without husbands to live like women with husbands. They could
specialize in motherhood, so to speak.
It has been argued that this "politics of protection" reflected more the
patriarchal gender ideology and class interests of reformers than the real
needs of poor women. 4 It is true that the women militants of the child
welfare movement, primarily responsible for developing welfare programs
and organizing for their enactment, were overwhelmingly white, middle-
class volunteers and members of emerging social welfare professions. Most
of them unquestioningly accepted the notion that men ought to take pri-
mary responsibility for their families' economic support, while mothers
should depend on a male breadwinner. On the other hand, some working-
class women, predominantly women trade unionists, defended working
mothers and argued for higher wages and unionization, so that women
could adequately care for their families. They resisted a politics of protec-
32. For an elaboration of this point, see Brenner & Laslett, Gender, Social Reproduction, aad the
State (November 1989) (paper presented to the Social Science History Association).
33. This analysis focuses mainly on the impact of class and gender, but also indicates the points at
which race inequality shaped the development of welfare policy.
34. Boris & Bardaglio, supra note 21, at 85-86; see also M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at
190-95.
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tion, claiming that it disadvantaged women in the labor market, reinforced
the idea that women could not be both good mothers and paid workers,
and institutionalized women's dependence."
Assumptions about proper family life shaped the way that mothers'
pension programs were organized, defended, and implemented. 6 Mothers'
right to support was conditioned on whether or not they conformed to
accepted gender roles and sexual codes. In withholding support to mothers
who were "undeserving," lawmakers, charitable organizations, social
workers and courts reinforced a gender ideology that defined independent
women as suspect and defined motherhood as a full-time job. But why did
so few women challenge that ideal or organize successfully around alter-
native programs? One explanation may lie in the social reality of the time:
the majority of married women with children, in both working-class and
middle-class families, did not work for pay full-time outside their
homes.17 Working-class women, and especially women of color, had to
contribute to their families-but they did so primarily by work that could
be combined with childbearing and childrearing, such as working at
home, working only during certain seasons, and taking in boarders." In
all classes, men were the primary family breadwinners, and the loss of
their income left women, particularly those with children, in dire poverty.
Low levels of women's trade union organization, women's exclusion from
skilled work and from many professions, and the unavailability of child-
care meant that dependence on the state for support was the only realistic
alternative for most women to dependence on fathers, male relatives or
charity.
In addition to limiting the alternatives open to single mothers, women's
economic dependence on men also restricted their capacity for political
organization and representation. While some middle-class women did or-
ganize, and thus played an important part in the creation of the welfare
state, the majority of women, from any class, were only marginally repre-
sented in the balance of organized political forces. This fact shaped the
political discourse-the voices of working-class women and women of
35. S. LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 1905-1925, at
162-68 (1987).
36. For a discussion of how racist ideologies also shaped early welfare state programs, see Mink,
supra note 23.
37. In 1900, 3% of native-born white married women, and 3.6% of foreign-born married women
worked outside the home. By 1920, only 6.3% of married native-born white women and 7.2% of
foreign-born wives were in the work force. Even as late as 1940, only 12% of white married women
worked outside the home. Labor force participation of Black wives was much higher-around 32%. C.
DEGLER, AT ODDS; WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRE-
SENT 384 (1980).
38. See J. JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAM-
ILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 125-26, 162-65 (1985); A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK:
A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 122-26 (1982).
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color generally were silenced. It also shaped reformers' strategies, which
had to adapt to political reality, to what might be winnable.
"Mothers' pensions" created a policy framework that shaped the later
establishment of federal income-maintenance programs for single
mothers. 9 The criteria differentiating "fit" from "unfit" mothers were
vague and arbitrary. Once deemed eligible, mothers often were supervised
by caseworkers to ensure that they provided a "suitable home." Although
legislation in many states covered women who were deserted, divorced, or
never-married, as well as widows, in practice these mothers tended to be
regarded as "unfit" and ineligible for support. Because local governments
were unwilling to spend much money on the programs, grants were very
small and most women were expected to supplement their grants with
wage work." On the other hand, paid work that took them away from
home was frowned upon and could result in termination. Home work
(sewing or taking in laundry, for instance) was a common solution-but
one that did little to pull these women out of poverty.
Mothers' pensions established the principle of government's responsibil-
ity for single mothers (or more accurately, perhaps, for the children of
single mothers). However, narrow eligibility requirements, along with ac-
companying distinctions between the deserving and the undeserving, low
funding, and successful political resistance at the local level excluded
many women from benefits. Most programs did not constitute a real alter-
native to dependence on male support." By the early 1930's, widows con-
39. Analyzing the two major income-maintenance programs of the Progressive era-mothers' pen-
sions and workmen's compensation--Barbara Nelson argues that the welfare state was characterized
from the beginning by a two-track system that sharply differentiated programs for women (and for
men of color) from those for white men. In workmen's compensation programs, eligibility was deter-
mined on straightforward decision criteria in the service of highly routinized decision-making. Routin-
ized decision rules and concomitantly simpler application procedures contributed to client satisfaction
with insurance programs and reinforced the social legitimacy of the clients as being deserving of their
benefits. Mothers' pensions, by contrast, used moralistic, diffuse decision criteria and allowed high
levels of bureaucratic discretion. Nelson, supra note 29. While Nelson's identification of differences in
programs directed to men and to women is appropriate, her distinction perhaps divides male and
female programs too sharply. For instance, as Handler points out, unemployment insurance also has
many continuing tests of "deservingness" (e.g., proof of looking for work) and only temporary protec-
tion from coercion (e.g., beneficiary cannot be forced to take "unsuitable" work). Handler, supra note
4, at 67-68. On the other hand, an important difference remained, at least up until the 1970's: Men's
eligibility rested on whether or not they were able to work; women's rested on whether or not they
were morally deserving.
40. Perhaps one reason state legislatures so easily passed mothers' pension legislation was that,
generally, funding was left entirely to the local governments. Most localities refused to expand taxa-
tion or shift spending from other activities, so the mothers' pensions programs remained quite small.
In many localities, the availability of benefits was keyed to local labor market demands, for instance,
suspending payments during harvests in order to assure a supply of labor for the fields. Racism
played a role also-poor Black women were more likely to be expected to work than white women.
See infra note 41.
41. On local resistance, especially in areas where Black women were an important source of wage
labor, see M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 194, 317-18. Opposition from local businesses has
continued to be a source of resistance to federal efforts to expand benefits. For example, a 1977 task
force of the National Governors' Conference found substantial opposition from several state govern-
ments to a national payment standard set at even 75% of the poverty level because it would have "an
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stituted 82% of recipients, 96% of all families served were white, and less
than 3% of all female-headed families received aid."'
In 1935, the federal government entered the picture with the creation of
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), which for the first time offered fed-
eral funds to states to establish financial assistance programs for needy
children.4 Women reformers, well-placed in the Roosevelt administration,
were key players in crafting the legislation and ensuring its inclusion in
the Social Security Act of 1935."' However, although personally influen-
tial, they had no political base. There was no "women's movement," no
feminist organization among the organizations and grass-roots forces that
formed the New Deal coalition. It is not surprising, then, that New Deal
policies incorporated the assumptions of the male breadwinner family
ideal: mothers ought to depend on male wages, the cure for poverty was
male employment, men should have priority in training and work
programs.
In 1939, amendments to the Social Security Act effectively separated
widows from other single mothers by establishing benefits for widows and
their children until the children reached age sixteen.45 Social security ben-
efits to widows were set by the federal government. But in ADC the level
unacceptable detrimental effect on the economies of those states by discouraging work by those with
low earnings levels or potential." L. SALAMON, supra note 30, at 122.
On the other hand, local governments also have been a source of political pressure on the federal
government to increase welfare spending. In the recent debates over welfare reform, the American
Public Welfare Association (APWA), representing state welfare administrators, pushed for a new
national minimum benefit standard roughly around the poverty line, to be indexed to inflation. Where
the federal government paid 50% to 78.5% of state costs, with poor states getting the higher share, the
APWA proposed a uniform federal share of 75%-an overall increase in the federal match. Wash.
Post, Apr. 15, 1987, at A21, col. 1.
42. See Handler, supra note 4, at 34.
43. Payment levels were very low, and there was no provision for a grant to the mother. A federal
matching grant for the mother was finally added in 1950 under pressure from state governments that
were facing increasing caseloads and rising expenditures on the program. W. TRATTNER, FROM
POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 291 (3d ed. 1984).
44. According to Edwin Witte, Executive Director of the Committee on Economic Security
(CES), which crafted the Social Security legislation, there was little interest in Congress in the ADC
program. "The major impetus for ADC came from the Children's Bureau whose proposals, based on
the Mothers' Pensions programs, CES accepted with little comment." M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2,
at 315. Susan Ware identifies twenty-eight women who formed the New Deal women's network,
among them Grace Abbott, chief of the Children's Bureau; Mary Anderson, head of the Women's
Bureau; Molly Dewson, director of the Women's Division, Democratic National Committee and
member of the Social Security Board; Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor; and Jane Hoey, director of
the Social Security Administration's Bureau of Public Assistance. S. WARE, supra note 31.
45. Since so many Black men worked in jobs not covered by Social Security, many Black widows
were not eligible for the more generous and less restrictive support through Social Security. M.
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 250. The establishment of Old Age Insurance moved older white male
workers into the ranks of the "deserving poor." Opponents of old-age pensions had always argued
that they undermined the work ethic and rewarded profligacy, because men would not have to rely on
their own efforts in order to provide for themselves and their families in old age. By tying eligibility to
a lifetime of continuous paid employment and by making the program contributory, proponents could
argue that Old Age Insurance would not undermine the necessity to labor. Further, the provision of
widows' pensions did not violate the assumptions of male responsibility and female dependence, al-
lowing white men as family breadwinners to provide for their wives and requiring women to stay
married in order to collect benefits in their old age.
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of benefits and determinations of eligibility for widows of uncovered male
workers, and for deserted, divorced or unmarried mothers, remained in
the hands of local authorities."' The superiority of Social Security benefits
to those in ADC reflected differences in political influence by gender and
by race. Widows' pensions rewarded faithful wives as part of a system of
benefits to white men.
During the 1950's, as the ADC caseload changed to include more di-
vorced, separated and unmarried mothers and more women of color, many
states tightened up eligibility requirements and increased harassment of
recipients. "Substitute father" rules made a single mother's male compan-
ion responsible for supporting her and her children. Surprise raids were
made on welfare mothers to search out the "man in the house" whose
presence would automatically disqualify them.' 7 "Suitable home" rules
based on vague and discretionary definitions of moral fitness often were
used to deny aid to unmarried mothers, whose "illegitimate" children au-
tomatically defined them as morally unfit."'
Throughout the 1950's, social workers and social scientists had pro-
posed, without much success, an increase in services to the poor, including
single mothers. By arguing that poor families needed counseling in order
to secure and retain jobs, social service professionals blamed the poor for
their condition and claimed a rehabilitative role for themselves. They ap-
peared to have won their point with the Kennedy administration. Ken-
nedy's 1962 "social service amendments" to the Social Security Act en-
couraged states to establish social services and hire caseworkers, for
example, by permitting states to claim 75% rather than 50% federal reim-
bursement for administrative costs in AFDC cases where rehabilitation
services were given."' These amendments were developed by two welfare
reform commissions appointed in 1961, which included many prominent
social workers. 50
ADC was changed to AFDC in 1962, and for the first time two-parent
families became eligible for assistance through AFDC-UP (Unemployed
Parent). Only half the states actually established AFDC-UP programs,
but with the inclusion of "able-bodied" men, Congress amended AFDC to
allow states to force recipients to work in exchange for their benefits.
However, since states were required to provide a 50% match for the Com-
munity Work and Training programs, as compared with a 25% match for
social services to AFDC recipients, only a few states actually instituted
46. By 1961, widowed families comprised only 7.7% of the ADC caseload, down from 43% in 1937.
Id. note 2, at 321.
47. Law, supra note 4, at 1259.
48. M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 323-26.
49. W. TRATTNER, supra note 43, at 299.
50. The commissions recommended first and foremost the provision of rehabilitative services by
professionally trained personnel and federal funding for social worker training. Id. at 299-300.
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"workfare" programs." In principle, however, husbands were expected to
work or search for work, while only "deserving" mothers who lacked men
to support them would be eligible for aid without either working or prov-
ing they were seeking work. Still, many localities found ways to keep sin-
gle mothers off the rolls. 2
The history of AFDC up to this point reveals that gains for single
mothers reflected political efforts of women reformers who were predomi-
nantly white and middle-class. Working-class women participated in the
mass movements that forced the expansion of the welfare state at the turn
of the century and in the 1930's. However, working-class women or-
ganizers were marginalized in those movements and even in the coalitions
that they sometimes formed with middle-class women reformers. This sit-
uation changed in the 1960's, when poor Black single mothers organized a
movement to convert welfare from a miserly, begrudged and demeaning
charity to a secure entitlement.
In alliance with professionals and middle-class reformers, especially
those from the federal poverty program (and within the context of the civil
rights movement) grass-roots groups of welfare mothers, organized in the
National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), won a major expansion
of AFDC in the late 1960s.53 The NWRO organized to demand ex-
panded benefits, to inform more poor women about their eligibility for
benefits, and to extend the rights of women recipients in relation to state
bureaucracies."" Between 1950 and 1965, the number of AFDC recipients
had increased approximately 6% a year. But between 1965 and 1970, the
annual rate of growth jumped to 18%. By 1975, the number of recipients
had reached 11 million, compared to only 3 million in 1960. 55
Community legal service lawyers from the poverty program were espe-
cially important allies for NWRO activists." Between 1967 and 1971,
368,000 families headed by unwed mothers became eligible for welfare
due to court rulings that overturned home eligibility checks, man-in-the
house rules, and midnight raids. In 1969 the Supreme Court declared resi-
dency requirements illegal, adding 800,000 to the AFDC rolls by 1970.5,
In addition to using the courts to expand poor women's access to support,
51. Differential matching requirements reflected the influence of social work professionals within
the Democratic administration and Congress at this time.
52. Even as late as 1967, only 60% of poor single mothers were receiving benefits. Handler, supra
note 4, at 73.
53. On the role of poverty program workers in supporting the organization of poor single
mothers, see F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 1, at 320-30.
54. On the successes of direct action by NWRO in expanding benefits, see N. KOTZ & M. KOTZ,
A PASSION FOR EQUALITY: GEORGE WILEY AND THE MOVEMENT 307-28 (1977).
55. Y. HASENFELD, supra note 14, at 28.
56. See W. TRAIrNER, supra note 43, at 302; F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR, supra note 1, at 306-20.




the welfare rights movement forced welfare departments to establish for-
mal grievance procedures that made arbitrary terminations more difficult.
NWRO groups informed poor women of their eligibility for assistance,
produced welfare rights handbooks for recipients, and succeeded in elimi-
nating some of the more intrusive and demeaning aspects of the welfare
system.5" By the end of the 1960's, poor women had won rights and pro-
tections that gave them a more secure claim to state support.5" Between
1965 and 1970 states increased AFDC benefit levels by 36%.6" The pro-
portion of eligible families headed by women who actually received bene-
fits increased from 60% in 1967 to nearly 90% in 1971.61 Real expendi-
tures for public benefits increased by 69% between 1965 and 1970. By 1970
welfare costs were expected to "exceed the budgeted amount by $1
billion."'62
The welfare rights movement not only increased the level of benefits
but helped to reduce the stigma of welfare and to secure women's entitle-
ment to state support. Almost from the first, however, this right came
under attack. In 1967, Congress considered amendments to the Social Se-
curity Act to penalize mothers of children born outside marriage or
mothers deserted by their husbands. The amendments proposed to freeze
federal aid to the states for such mothers, denying additional funding to
states that increased the proportion of unwed or deserted mothers in their
caseloads. Opposition from the social service establishment and civil rights
and welfare rights organizations forced withdrawal of the amendments by
1969.63
Also in 1967, Congress began to consider the issue of moving recipients
off the rolls and into paid work. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee, asked, "What in the world is wrong -with requir-
ing these people to submit themselves, if they are to draw public funds, to
a test of their ability to learn a job?"64 This conservative backlash was
fairly well countered by the welfare advocates. While Congress did estab-
lish the Work Incentive Program (WIN), most of the provisions aimed at
punishing welfare mothers were removed. WIN's "earned income disre-
gard" allowed recipients to earn a certain amount without affecting their
grant.6" Previously, any dollar earned had been deducted from the AFDC
58. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 1, at 306-20.
59. Sylvia Law calls this the "legalization of welfare." Law, supra note 4, at 1267-71.
60. I. GARFINKEL & S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 110-14 (1986).
61. Id.
62. G. WEST, THE NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 295-99 (1981).
63. L. SALAMON, supra note 30, at 89. The NWRO also played a role in defeating Nixon's
Family Assistance Plan. The Plan's guaranteed minimum family income was so low that it would
have reduced support to welfare recipients in high-benefit states. Id. at 91-97.
64. M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 340.
65. Individuals can continue receiving aid if their monthly income (after deducting actual work
expenses such as childcare, transportation, and uniforms), plus one-third of the remaining gross, is
less than the state-defined need standard.
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award, effectively penalizing recipients for working. In addition to the
earned-income disregard, WIN allocated federal funds for states to de-
velop programs aimed at placing recipients in jobs. Participants were re-
quired to register for work, accept referrals to training or work experience
programs, and take any bona fide job offer. WIN participation was
mandatory for men in AFDC-UP, but only voluntary for single mothers
of children six years old or more for whom childcare was to be available
while they were in training or searching for a job."' Mothers of younger
children were not expected to participate.
The gains of the 1960's could not continue. Benefits to single mothers
would not have increased without the mobilization of poor Black women
in the NWRO, the urban rebellions of the early 1960's, and the civil
rights and Black power movements. But the welfare expansion was also
made possible by the post-war prosperity. In the context of an expanding
economy, state managers could respond to political pressures by increasing
taxation and spending without threatening capital accumulation. Indeed,
the post-World War II welfare state was funded predominantly by in-
creasing taxation on personal incomes and individual households, not cor-
porate revenue.6 7 The entire edifice of liberal welfare state politics relied
on economic expansion-rising real incomes took the sting out of the in-
creasing tax burden on wage and salary workers.
From the early 1970's, economic pressure on corporate profits led to an
increasingly well-organized employers' offensive against working class
standards of living. Over the 1970's, median real family income declined
by 16%, while regressive taxes were rising. 8 Existing social and economic
divisions-between the unemployed and the employed, between public
and private workers, between whites and people of color-were aggra-
vated as groups scrambled to improve their incomes, generally at the ex-
pense of one another. In this economic context, political liberalism and
support for the welfare state unraveled.
The shift in political climate was already clear in 1976, when Carter
campaigned for the Democratic Party nomination as a Washington out-
sider opposed to the "bloated federal bureaucracy," sounding themes that
Reagan was to use against him in 1980. The passage of Proposition 13 in
California began a "tax-payers' revolt," which swept into many states in
the late 1970's. Although expansion was no longer on the agenda, through
66. In the case of the WIN regulations, we can see how a politics of protection that considers men
but not women "able-bodied" and thus expects men, but not women, to work, discriminates against
women as workers. As Law argues, men were given preference in assignment to training programs,
although many single mothers also volunteered to be trained. Law, supra note 4, at 1286-87.
67. The effective tax rate on corporate income declined steadily from a high of 40% in the early
1950's to 13% in 1982. J. PECHMAN, THE RICH, THE POOR, AND THE TAXES THEY PAY (1986).
68. Not surprisingly, acceptance of state spending for programs decreased among some groups,
such as union households, which had previously supported them. See Brown, The Segmented Welfare
System: Distributive Conflict and Retrenchment in the United States, 1968-1984, in REMAKING THE
WELFARE STATE, supra note 16, at 182, 197-98.
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the mid-70's, liberals and conservatives essentially forced a stalemate
around welfare policy. The political and economic climate made it diffi-
cult to pass new programs that increased spending, so conservatives were
able to defeat initiatives such as Carter's proposal to create public service
jobs for welfare recipients, which promised to add as much as $12.4 bil-
lion to the federal budget.6 9 On the other hand, the 1960's had created a
much larger and better organized social welfare lobby, including organiza-
tions such as the American Public Welfare Association, the National
Council of Local Public Welfare Administrators, the National Association
of Social Workers, the Children's Defense Fund, the National Child Sup-
port Enforcement Association, the Coalition for Human Needs, and the
Child Welfare League. This lobby, together with civil rights and trade
union organizations, was sufficiently influential in Congress to contain,
although not entirely prevent, conservative schemes-for example, propos-
als to make the Work Incentive Program mandatory for women with chil-
dren under six. 7
0
In 1971, for the first time, Congress broke with the principle of sup-
porting single mothers to stay home with their children. Amendments to
the Work Incentive Program (WIN II) expanded the definition of the
able-bodied poor to include mothers with children six or older, required
their registration in the program, and refocused the program from educa-
tion and vocational training to employment services and subsidized em-
ployment.71 However, because the state was required to provide childcare
to mothers participating in WIN II, many recipients were registered but
placed in a "hold" category and never in fact participated. De facto,
mothers were exempted.
WIN II blurred the distinction between forcing recipients to work in
exchange for benefits ("workfare") and providing training and services.
Under the guise of "work experience" programs, states could require
WIN II participants to work in public service jobs or else lose their
eligibility."3
Because the welfare state relied on redistributing resources among wage
and salary workers rather than reallocating resources from capital to la-
69. Budget limits were not the only problem with Carter's program. It was opposed by the AFL-
CIO and public employee unions because it proposed to pay welfare recipients placed in public jobs
the minimum wage rather than the prevailing wage. L. SALAMON, supra note 30, at 203.
70. The visible role of Black women in the welfare rights movement and the increasing proportion
of Black women among welfare recipients helped to fuel the conservative backlash.
71. Congressional conservatives had tried unsuccessfully in 1967 to force all states to require
mothers of school-age children to register for WIN programs. Interestingly, policy toward the work
participation of welfare mothers parallels the general experience of mothers not on welfare. By the
early 1970's, the majority of mothers of school-age children were in the labor force.
72. This was still true in 1980 when 39% of all adult AFDC recipients were registered, but only
19% ever participated, only 2% were enrolled in training, and only 1% found a job through WIN. Y.
HASENFELD, supra note 14, at 43-44.
73. However, Congress still would not fund straightforward "work for relief" programs. States
establishing such programs had to use state funds.
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bor, liberal proponents of welfare were increasingly on the defensive dur-
ing the 1970's. Declining productivity and competitiveness in the U.S.
economy required policies to create a positive business climate, such as
corporate tax breaks and the diversion of investment resources to the pri-
vate sector. 4 The need to restore corporate profitability on the one hand,
and the resistance of large numbers of voters to tax increases on the other,
left administrations and legislatures little choice but to trim taxes and
spending. The Reagan landslide and Republican control of the Congress
in 1980 opened the way for a successful conservative offensive against so-
cial expenditures and forced welfare advocates to design a new strategy.
In passing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA),
Congress launched an assault on AFDC which managed to cut the rolls
by 8% in one year. 5 Ironically, while Reagan's rhetoric emphasized put-
ting recipients to work, in fact the vast majority who suffered benefit cuts
or who were declared noneligible were the working poor.76 The Act cut
funding for WIN Programs in half between 1979 and 1984; limited the
earned income disregard provision to four months' support; and estab-
lished a cap on eligibility for gross income at 150% of the state's need
standard. 7 Seven hundred thousand households with working parents
were cut from the welfare rolls or had their benefits reduced, and the
proportion of all poor families with children under eighteen receiving
AFDC dropped from an average of 83% during the 1970's to 63% by
1983.78
Abramovitz argues that the cuts were designed to drive more women
into the wage labor market to fill the demand for low-paid female labor.
In addition, she suggests that the increasing numbers of recipients indi-
cated that welfare had become too attractive an alternative to marriage.7 9
This assertion makes little sense. First, the rapid increases in AFDC re-
cipients had ended; enrollment had stabilized by the mid-1970's. Second,
most of the recipients affected by the legislation already participated in the
labor force. Unemployment remains relatively high; no real evidence of a
shortage of low-paid labor, including women's labor, exists (except in a
few especially high-wage areas, like Massachusetts). It may be true that
even though the value of cash and in-kind benefits average well below the
poverty line in most states, welfare is a better deal than paid work for
most single mothers of young children. Even so, the OBRA cuts did not
74. Between 1966 and 1985, the effective tax rate on capital was cut in half. J. PECHMAN, WHO
PAID TAXES: 1966-1985?, at 73 (1985).
75. M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 358.
76. Moffitt and Wolf estimate that 35% of working welfare recipients lost eligibility. Moffitt &
Wolf, The Effects of the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act on Welfare Recipients and Work
Incentives, 61 Soc. SERV. REV. 247 (1987).
77. Sarri, Federal Policy Changes and the Feminization of Poverty, 64 J. CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE AM. 235, 236 (1985).
78. M. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 358.
79. Id. at 353.
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target those women, driving them into the workforce. If anything, the cuts
might have forced women back on welfare, because they lost the benefits
which supplemented their low wages."0
While able to cut federal funds for the working poor, even the Republi-
can Congress could not pass the mandatory "workfare" programs that
Reagan wanted. The forces opposed to "workfare" programs include pub-
lic employee unions adamantly opposed to placing recipients in jobs that
otherwise would be done for a union wage, welfare rights groups con-
testing what they call "welfare slavery," and social service lobbies, such as
the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) who oppose any
mandatory program."' While not requiring "workfare," Congress for the
first time allowed states to use federal funds for such programs.8 2 How-
ever, most states which did not already have "workfare" programs did not
establish them, preferring instead to experiment with training, work expe-
rience, and employment (WIN Demonstration) programs. These state
programs provided the model for the Democratic House and Senate wel-
fare reform bills introduced in 1987.8" Essentially, welfare reformers con-
ceded the ground on single mothers' employment in order to craft a pro-
gram that they hoped would increase federal funding for state programs
and benefits for women on welfare. Disputes over the specific provisions
of the welfare reform legislation reflected this goal. Republican proposals
were punitive, provided few benefits, and were therefore cheaper. Demo-
cratic versions varied from those with least protections and benefits for
clients (S. 1511, Moynihan's bill) to those with more (H.R. 1720 was
estimated to cost $2.3 billion more than Moynihan's bill). The most lib-
eral proposal, H.R. 1720, as amended by the Education and Labor Com-
mittee, responded to many of the objections opponents had raised against
previous proposals for "putting welfare women to work." For example,
H.R. 1720 emphasized voluntary over mandatory placement in training,
work experience, job search or paid work programs and limited the par-
80. The same argument applies to the 1971 legislation making the WIN program mandatory for
women with school-age children. It passed in a recessionary period, not a time of labor shortages. Its
proponents argued it would cut costs, but like the previous WIN program, WIN II moved few recipi-
ents off welfare, and appears to have raised, rather than lowered, overall costs. M. REIN, DILEMMAS
OF WELFARE POLICY: WHY WORK STRATEGIES HAVEN'T WORKED (1982); see also Law, supra
note 4, at 1336-37. It is difficult to demonstrate the legislation's economic or social effectiveness, even
in mediating conflicting needs of capital and patriarchy.
81. NASW opposed Moynihan's bill because it did not require all state employment and training
programs to include an "employability plan, client-agency contract and case management." Nat'l
Ass'n of Soc. Workers, Legislative Alert (Oct. 28, 1987). The final bill mandated the plan, but not
case management.
82. Although the original House bill proposed to limit all Community Work Experience Program
(CWEP) assignments to six months, the final House bill and the 1988 Family Support Act allowed
states to use CWEP as part of the new training, job search and employment program. The Family
Support Act also included rules to protect existing public jobs and wage rates from being undermined
by the use of welfare recipients. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted
in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2879, 2932 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998].
83. Gueron, Reforming Welfare with Work, PUBLIC WELFARE, Fall 1987, at 14, 17.
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ticipation of women with children under six years old to 20 hours per
week. It placed further restrictions on Community Work Experience Pro-
grams (CWEP). It protected recipients from being forced to take a job if
they would end up with real family income lower than their income on
welfare. The bill subsidized poor working mothers' childcare expenses for
up to a year" and required states to provide education as well as voca-
tional training, while permitting states to use federal funds for post-
secondary education for welfare mothers.8 5
Even the most generous proposal, of course, did not come close to pro-
viding the range of services necessary to move women out of poverty.
Moreover, none included what many reformers see as the major need: the
creation of a national benefit standard and an increase in federal funding
levels, so that benefits allow families to live above the state poverty level.
Finally, no welfare reform bill addresses the major cause of poverty-low
wages and unemployment.
The political conjuncture that created support for the Family Support
Act was shaped by fundamental changes in the economy and in gender
relations. The structural economic shifts affected the politics of welfare in
two ways. First, the fading of U.S. world economic hegemony and the
crisis of profitability, which produced an employers' offensive on workers'
standards of living and required state subsidies to the private sector,
placed relatively stringent limits on the "guns and butter" welfare state
expansion of the 1950's and 1960's. Second, the restructuring of the U.S.
economy undermined the male breadwinner family. Declining male wages
and greater demand for women workers, especially in low-paid clerical
and service jobs, sent increasing numbers of women into wage work. In a
period where the vast majority of women with young children work for
wages, a welfare policy that pays women to stay home is anachronistic.
Most single mothers, including those with children under six, are in
full-time paid work. But many married mothers are also in the labor
force. Almost 33% of married mothers with children under three and 40%
of married mothers with children three to five work full-time outside of
the home. Well over half of all married mothers of children under six are
employed either full or part-time.86 That even mothers in two-parent
families are in paid work fundamentally undermines traditional defini-
tions of motherhood. Full-time motherhood appears to be more a sign of
affluence, a kind of luxury spending, than a biological necessity. While
economic restructuring has somewhat worsened the conditions of life of
84. However, the bill set a low cap on expenses-S175 per month for a child over two, and $200
per month for a child under two. Still, this cap was higher than the $160 per month cap in S. 1511.
85. The Moynihan bill did not require states to provide the more costly training and education
programs, encouraging a continuation of the meaningless "make-work" activities that have thus far
characterized much of the WIN program.
86. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Marital & Family Characteristics of the Labor
Force 1987 (unpublished table on file with author).
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many working-class women (and especially women of color), opportuni-
ties for paid work, however unequal they are in comparison to those for
men, have improved women's alternatives to depending on men for eco-
nomic support. Women's increasing access to income, although still lim-
ited, has underwritten a feminist challenge to traditional gender ideology.
This challenge has been conducted predominantly in the service of the
middle-class and affluent working woman rather than the working-class
and poor woman. Nonetheless, the current consensus on welfare reform
reflects the political impact of feminism. Feminists have not only signifi-
cantly changed attitudes but also established a permanent representation
of women within the political system. However fragile, the emergence of a
"(women's policy network" connecting women in Congress to a large array
of groups which can craft and lobby for legislation and mobilize constitu-
encies has given liberal feminism a political voice.8 7 That voice made
women's impoverishment a political issue and shaped proposed solutions.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE WELFARE REFORM CONSENSUS
By shifting costs for welfare onto the states and at the same time subsi-
dizing welfare-to-work demonstration programs, OBRA provided much of
the impetus behind welfare reform.88 Governors and their welfare admin-
istrators responded to the increasing burden by utilizing welfare reform to
re-federalize welfare costs. Within an ideology of promoting "indepen-
dence," governors and state welfare administrators lobbied Congress in-
tensively for increased funding of work incentive programs as a vehicle for
getting money back into the states.89 Perhaps it is not surprising that state
managers accepted a trade-off in which increasing funds were purchased
at the cost of further undermining single mothers' entitlement to state sup-
port. But the most significant development in the emerging welfare reform
consensus was that groups and organizations which had fought to defend
this right for a long time now gave it up.
87. Costain, Representing Women: the Transition from Social Movement to Interest Group, in
WOMEN, POWER AND POLICY 19 (E. Bonaparth ed. 1982); see also S. HARTMANN, FROM MARGIN
TO MAINSTREAM: AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS SINCE 1960, at chs. 5 & 7 (1989).
88. Federal funding for WIN declined from $365 million in FY 1981 to $93 million in FY 1988.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, supra note 82. By 1985, total spending for WIN approximated the level
of funding in 1981, although federal spending had dropped. On average for all Work Programs, states
paid 25% of the costs. Y. HASENFELD, supra note 14, at 51.
89. For instance, the American Public Welfare Association's National Council of State Human
Service Administrators called for welfare-to-jobs programs to be funded with a 75% federal share not
subject to appropriations ceilings, whereas WIN allocations were capped. Am. Public Welfare Ass'n
& Nat'l Council of State Human Service Adm'rs, One Child in Four 20 (n.d.). They were successful
in part. Although Congress rejected an open-ended entitlement, the Family Support Act significantly
raises the cap on federal matching funds for the new welfare-to-work program (JOBS) above what it
had been for WIN and the other welfare-to-work programs (from $365 million in 1987 to $600
million in 1989). Whereas federal matching funds for childcare were subject to appropriation under
WIN, the Act provides open-ended entitlement with a federal matching rate of 50% to 80%, and sets
the allowable reimbursement at the applicable local market rate. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, supra
note 82, at 161-62.
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The absence of any radical, grass-roots women's organization (or at
least the extreme political marginalization of such organizations) affects
the development of policy in two ways: 1) it narrows the parameters of
politically winnable reforms, and 2) it encourages technocratic solutions,
which aim to manage poverty as a social problem without empowering
women. Middle-class allies of the poor-social service professionals, pol-
icy analysts, lobbyists and legislators-are encouraged by their education,
professional formation, and social structural position to explain poverty in
terms of cultural and personal disabilities rather than the structure of eco-
nomic opportunity.90 But these tendencies can be challenged by organized
groups and social movements or reinforced when the movements decline.
During the 1980's, the discourse around welfare shifted as the social
welfare lobby attempted to adapt to the prevailing political climate.91 In
the 1950's and 1960's, social workers and policy planners used a culture of
poverty analysis to justify increased spending on benefits and services to
poor families-to intervene in the intergenerational transmission of pov-
erty by rehabilitating mothers and providing more security and opportu-
nity for children. Welfare rights and civil rights organizations, on the
other hand, contested the culture of poverty and claimed benefits as a
right that women had as mothers and as human beings. Although service
professionals and welfare rights activists did not speak the same language,
they both argued for increasing benefits to welfare mothers. In the context
of the civil rights and Black power movements, the organization of the
urban poor in welfare rights and other community organizations, and the
consequent threat of political and social disruption, social work profes-
sionals provided the legitimating arguments for a policy of increasing ben-
efits that was being forced on the legislature anyway.
In the late 1970's and especially in the 1980's, concerned to justify their
programs and positions and freed from any pressure from below, social
policy experts began to emphasize work incentives and the need to move
individuals, including single mothers, out of "dependency." Job training
and placement is defended in terms of educating young mothers-who are
the heart of the "hard-core" welfare population-so that they can become
self-supporting. Welfare reform targets teenage parent families and fami-
lies receiving AFDC for two or more years. Advocates argue that by
spending more on these families, the intergenerational cycle of poverty can
be broken and current costs lowered as the 15% to 25% of the welfare
recipients who require long-term support move into the workforce.92 This
90. J. EHRENREICH, THE ALTRUISTIC IMAGINATION (1985).
91. Nichols-Casebolt & McClure, supra note 10.
92. For an excellent review of the literature on whether single motherhood causes inter-
generational poverty, see S. MCLANAHAN & K. BOOTH, MOTHER ONLY FAMILIES: PROBLEMS, RE-




political discourse revives the culture of poverty analysis on a new basis:
teenage girls, or more specifically Black teenage girls, not adult women as
in the 1960's, have been forced to shoulder the blame for poverty. If, at
the turn of the century, the "backward" immigrant woman and her
"drunkard" husband peopled the victim-blaming discourses on poverty,
since World War II, Blacks have been the icons of the poor. The 1960's
paradigm was the "matriarchal" Black mother and her "shiftless street-
corner" husband; today, it is the "promiscuous" Black teenager and her
"drug-gang" boyfriend.
This shift in political discourse has spread far beyond the social layers
in which it originated. Even groups and organizations that had attacked
the Moynihan Report and the culture of poverty in the 1960's have begun
to adopt it. In the 1960's, civil rights organizations countered the Moyni-
han Report by arguing that the end of institutionalized racism and the
creation of decent and well-paid jobs for Black people (or more accurately,
Black men) were the solution to poverty. But by 1987 the Black Family
Summit, convened by the Urban League and the NAACP, emphasized
strategies of self-help. John Jacobs, president of the Urban League, as-
serted: "In concentrating on the wrongs of discrimination and poverty we
have neglected the fact that there is a lot we can do about our problems
ourselves." ' Black leader Eleanor Holmes Norton, former Chair of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, has written on the theme
of restoring the traditional Black family. "The family's return to its his-
toric strength," she argues, "will require the overthrow of the complicated
predatory ghetto subculture, a fact demanding not only new government
approaches, but active Black leadership and community participation and
commitment." 94
The demoralization and disorganization of urban Black ghettos cannot
be denied. And perhaps it is not surprising that, in the wake of the politi-
cal defeat of full-employment programs (such as Humphrey-Hawkins)
and the dismantling of the legislative and judicial attack on institutional-
ized racism, Black organizations have adopted a rhetoric of self-help as a
way to funnel some money into social services for the Black community.
Because the analysis of poverty in terms of family disorganization seems
to succeed in attracting foundation and corporate funds to community pro-
grams run by Black organizations, organizers are tempted to use it. For
example, the Black Family Reunion Celebration, organized by the Na-
93. Welfare in Focus at Urban League, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
94. Norton, Restoring the Traditional Black Family, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1985, § 6 (Magazine),
at 43; see also Black columnist William Raspberry's approval of conservative Stuart Butler's assertion
that "if you begin with the idea that to father a child is to take on responsibility for that child, then
you are likely to get serious about child support. You won't allow AFDC to allow a teen-age mother
to set up a separate home and thereby be virtually condemned to poverty." Raspberry, Begin Welfare
Reform at Grass Roots, Oregonian, May 1988. For a critique of this approach, see Davis & Davis,
The Black Family and the Crisis of Capitalism, 17 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 33 (1986).
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tional Council of Negro Women, was funded by Proctor & Gamble, East-
man Kodak, and Coca-Cola. This turn in Black politics has also helped to
create a climate for welfare reform as a "solution" to Black poverty.
The new "culture of poverty" politics does acknowledge institutional-
ized racism in pointing out that declining job opportunities for working-
class young men, and because of racisim, especially for young black men,
are responsible for the rise in single-parent families. Young mothers are
on welfare because the fathers of their children cannot support them.95
This argument contains an important truth. But it also draws on and
promotes a male breadwinner ideal: the solution to women's impoverish-
ment is to recompose the nuclear family. Indeed, pro-family discourse per-
meates the advocacy of welfare reform, evident in arguments for requiring
all states to fund the AFDC-UP program. It is clearly a step forward for
unemployed fathers to be seen as legitimate recipients of support. The
difficulty lies in arguing for AFDC-UP as a "solution" to the rise of
women-headed families, which denies the reality that, as the Black femi-
nist Barbara Omolade has put it, single motherhood is "both a chosen and
an imposed condition."96
Mainstream feminist organizations (NWPC, NOW, Congressional
Women's Caucus, Women's Equity Action League, etc.) have not made
the welfare reform debate a priority.97 In the year when welfare reform
was a major initiative, the Congressional Women's Caucus and other fem-
inist organizations focused on a package of legislation primarily aimed at
the problems of working parents, problems such as parental leave and
childcare.9 Their major initiative against the impoverishment of single
mothers has been Child Support Enforcement legislation, not raising
AFDC benefits or expanding eligibility. 9 Women's groups have pressed
for automatic withholding of child support, higher monetary awards, and
95. See, e.g., M. WRIGHT-EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (1987);
W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
96. 'Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: Black Single Mothers, AFRICANA POLITICS, Fall 1986, at 11.
97. Black organizations (National Urban League, NAACP, National Council of Negro Women,
etc.) have been much more involved in lobbying for and crafting alternative programs. This may
reflect their larger constituency among the poor and the fact that social service entrepreneurship
among Black professionals is more concentrated in programs to deal with poverty.
98. One feminist organization, Wider Opportunities for Women, did initiate and direct an impor-
tant intervention in the Congressional consideration of welfare reform. Their National Coalition on
Women, Work and Welfare Reform crafted an alternative reform program which was presented in
Congressional hearings, press conferences, and letters to legislators. Their proposal accepted the goal
of transforming the welfare system into one which enables recipients to become economically self-
sufficient. But they argued for making employment and training programs voluntary, increasing and
standardizing minimum benefits, extending support services and subsidies to those who leave welfare
for low-paid work, and effectively enforcing child support. Along with other advocates for the poor,
their efforts no doubt helped to blunt some of the more conservative proposals. See NAT'L COALITION
ON WOMEN, WORK AND WELFARE REFORM, CHANGING WELFARE: AN INVESTMENT IN WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN POVERTY (1987).
99. For a critique of "feminization of poverty" campaigns that target child-support enforcement,
see Brenner, Feminist Political Discourses: Radical Versus Liberal Approaches to the Feminization
of Poverty and Comparable Worth, 1 GENDER & SOCIETY 447 (1987).
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state help in tracking down delinquent fathers. The Family Support Act
responded to some of these demands. The major beneficiaries of increased
enforcement, however, are not AFDC mothers, because the fathers of chil-
dren on AFDC are generally working in very low-paid jobs or unem-
ployed. According to federal projections by the Health and Human Ser-
vices Agency, higher child support payments would lift less than 10% of
families off the welfare rolls.100
A more positive effect of feminism on the welfare reform consensus is
the agreement that moving women into paid work requires childcare and
health benefits for transition periods. In these provisions, the Family Sup-
port Act recognizes that women workers have needs different from those
of men, needs which the state has an obligation to meet. It is no accident
that this recognition has occurred in a period when feminist groups have
been targeting work/family issues for legislative action. Without the femi-
nist challenge to traditional roles and its demands for social supports for
working women, women's increasing labor force participation alone would
have produced a very different legislative climate, one in which the special
needs of women workers may have been ignored.
While able to mobilize grass-roots support around certain issues, such
as legalized abortion, most advocates for women are not connected to a
radicalized grass-roots constituency. Yet without such a constituency, it is
easy enough for feminist organizations to ignore welfare reform's threat to
poor women and to accept the apparently narrow limits of what might be
"winnable. 10
THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988
It is too early to assess the impact of the Family Support Act of 1988
on welfare recipients. The Act follows previous policy in allowing states
wide flexibility. Thus we can expect the usual pattern in which the more
liberal and prosperous states will have programs that are less punitive and
provide more services than those in the more conservative and poorer
states. But in general, services will be underfunded and offices will con-
tinue to be understaffed, recipients will continue to have to negotiate a
bewildering array of rules and regulations, some individuals who are eli-
gible for benefits will be routinely terminated, and so forth.
100. Some estimates of the impact of child support enforcement on poor women's incomes are
higher. Assuming relatively high childcare awards (17% of father's income for one child, 25% for
two), those estimates indicated that the poverty gap-the difference between the incomes of poor fami-
lies headed by single mothers and the amount of money they would need to move above the poverty
level-would be reduced by 27%. I. GARFINKEL & S. MCLANAHAN, supra note 60, at 25.
101. Although they put their resources and attention elsewhere, many women's organizations did
ultimately take a position on welfare reform during the last months of debate on the welfare reform
legislation. They focused predominantly on making the work and training provisions voluntary rather
than mandatory and on strengthening child support enforcement. See, e.g., Deyss, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. Times, May 19, 1988 (Social Policy Director, League of Women Voters).
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The bill seems to be the usual mix of trade-offs and compromises. Con-
servatives maintained federal funding for "workfare" (CWEP), while lib-
erals added education to the services that states must provide in the JOBS
program (the WIN replacement). Participation in the JOBS program will
be mandatory for women with children over three, and states may make it
mandatory for women with children as young as one. On the other hand,
women with children under six cannot be required to participate more
than twenty hours per week, and first consideration for enrollment must
be given to volunteers.10 2 Evidence from the demonstration programs on
which JOBS is based indicates that there have generally been more volun-
teers than slots when appropriate services are provided, so the program
might in fact be voluntary for quite some time. While the Reagan admin-
istration pressured Congress to set high participation goals, the Act sets
relatively modest goals. States need to provide slots for only 7% of their
eligible caseload by 1991 and for only 20% by 1995. Still, in the more
punitive states, the work requirements could be enforced arbitrarily in or-
der to push more mothers of children under six into paid work and off the
rolls. On the other hand, for mothers of children six or over, who were
already subject to a work requirement under the WIN programs, the
JOBS program offers some improvements. For instance, recipients must
have achieved a basic level of literacy before they can be forced into job
search or job training. In California's GAIN (the WIN Demonstration
Program) over 55% of participants needed remedial education.1'3 Recipi-
ents can be required to look for work for only two to four months out of
the year. And there are firm restrictions preventing states from forcing
recipients to take jobs which lower their standard of living.", The Act
provides childcare and health care subsidies for one year after an individ-
ual leaves the welfare rolls for employment, makes these benefits available
to all recipients, and requires states adequately to inform individuals of
their entitlement. 0 5 In this area, the Act substantially increases subsidies
to poor working women.'"A However, the cap on childcare subsidies,
102. Here, again, we see a parallel between the labor force participation of married mothers and
the demands made on welfare mothers: The great majority of married mothers with young children
who work, do so part-time.
103. Handler, supra note 4, at 87.
104. Recipients in high benefit states fare better under these restrictions. In California, a high
benefit state, a mother of two would have to get a job earning $7.00 an hour for 40 hours a week to
approximate her living standard on welfare. Y. HASENFELD, supra note 14, at 88. In Oregon, a low
benefit state, the JOBS program requirement that mothers of children under six may not be forced to
work more than 20 hours a week will result in a major increase in caseload levels and client eligibility
for benefits. ADULT & FAMILY SERVS. Div., IMPACT OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT ON OREGON
(1988).
105. Previously, although recipients who left welfare for work were eligible for four months of
transitional medicaid benefits, many states did not inform recipients of this benefit. Since the Congres-
sional Budget Office based its estimate of the costs of the new Act on current levels of use, it probably
underestimated the level of new funding that transitional benefits will require.
106. However, under the new Act, child and health care benefits end after one year, raising the
possibility that individuals will not be able to continue in employment and will return to welfare.
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which is negotiated individually by the states and the federal government,
may still be set too low to provide quality care.
Whether, overall, these different trade-offs will leave poor single
mothers better or worse off than before is difficult to assess. It is clear,
however, that this reform will not diminish the impoverishment of single
mothers, the vast majority of whom will remain marginalized, low-paid
workers.'07
DEFINING A FEMINIST STANCE TOWARD WELFARE REFORM
Disagreement about welfare reform highlights the tension between "dif-
ferent treatment" and "equal treatment" strategies in feminist politics. In
a competitive market society, living standards are expected to reflect indi-
vidual effort. State provisions are legitimate only to guarantee the bare
minimum. Therefore, state support for full-time mothers can only be jus-
tified if mothers' care is a necessity, not a choice. But to make this claim is
to assert a natural and intense relationship between mothers and their
children and between women and nurture. A politics of difference thus
appears to reinforce traditional constructions of womanhood. On the other
hand, a politics of equality, which argues that women and mothers have a
right to economic independence, to be "family breadwinners" just like
men, appears to reinforce conservative attempts to force welfare mothers
into work without childcare or other support. Conservatives argue that
women on welfare need to be "weaned" from dependence into indepen-
dence. Welfare handouts, they claim, breed psychological dependency, a
lack of self-discipline, and promiscuous pleasure-seeking rather than re-
sponsible self-control.
Feminists who attack the reforms fear the more punitive proposals.
They have accused supporters of adopting a "middle-class" and male-
identified perspective which ignores the real needs and conditions of work-
ing-class and poor women, devalues motherhood as work, and cooperates
in state schemes to cut the welfare rolls by producing a captive pool of
low-waged female labor for the growing service industries.' 0 8 Those femi-
nists who defend the reforms look to the more generous options. In re-
sponse to the critics, they argue that dependence on a male-controlled state
Conservatives were extremely concerned about this possibility and attempted to introduce various pu-
nitive schemes to prevent it. Liberals were able to counter these attempts in the area of medicaid
benefits. The Act now says that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) must conduct a
study of the impact of transitional medical assistance on welfare dependency. For childcare subsidies,
the Act empowers the Secretary of HHS to issue restrictive regulations if a study finds such "re-
cycling" is occurring. According to one informant, the difference in the two clauses reflects the differ-
ence in seniority and power of the respective committee chairs.
107. Forty percent of all AFDC recipients who leave AFDC have incomes below the poverty level
in the years following AFDC support. Sarri, supra note 77, at 237.
108. Piven & Ehrenreich, Workfare Means New Mass Peonage, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at
A31, col. 2.
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represents no real improvement for women, that benefits will never be
high enough to offer full-time mothers a reasonable standard of living,
and that most working-class women in fact want to work and to be eco-
nomically independent.10 9
The feminist debate on welfare policy reflects the real difficulty in de-
veloping a strategy for reforms that are both achievable and emancipatory.
The costs required to move women out of poverty-increased training and
education, subsidized childcare, medical benefits, and decent jobs-are far
beyond what can now be won. Neither poor people nor their potential
allies are well-organized. Under these conditions, any attainable reform
might leave poor women worse off-they risk losing their claim to income
maintenance without moving any closer to economic self-sufficiency.
Despite the dangers, I would argue for a strategy centered on providing
working mothers with support rather than demanding payments for
women to stay home with their children. There is much in the current
legislation to oppose: requirements that teenage mothers live with their
families in order to be eligible for state support; continuation of federal
subsidies to state workfare programs; excessive flexibility to local govern-
ments in implementing programs; inadequate grievance procedures and
protections for recipients; and no national benefit standard which would
ensure income above the poverty line. On the other hand, the new legisla-
tion offers a substantial infusion of new federal money to poor families in
some of its features, particularly the continuation of childcare and health
benefits for a year after an individual leaves welfare for employment and
the requirement that all states introduce AFDC-UP. One can support
those provisions of the Act which mandate training and education pro-
grams and which target services to teenage mothers, without supporting
the new "culture of poverty" politics. It is true, as critics argue, that many
poor single mothers in fact need nothing more than well-paying
jobs-their poverty can be cured better through a jobs program than a
social service program. But an adequate jobs program is not imminent. In
the meantime, states should not be allowed to fill their JOBS programs
with employable individuals who are likely to leave welfare for low-paid
jobs anyway. It may be practical, under current circumstances, to require
states to concentrate services on those most in need of them, primarily
teenage mothers and long-term recipients. But to promise that providing
teenage mothers with work, education, and training programs will cure
poverty is not only impractical, it is harmful. Such claims reinforce the
victim-blaming discourses on poverty and undermine the arguments for
full-employment programs.
In entering the welfare reform debate, feminists must emphasize the
need to go much further in providing high cash benefits and a guaranteed
109. Bader, Will Workfare Do the Job?, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR WOMEN, Jan./Feb. 1988, at 1, 9.
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standard of living to all households. A program of jobs and support pro-
vides possibilities for movement building and alliances. Welfare families'
needs should be aligned to those of the working poor and nonpoor by
arguing for an increase in the range and quality of services provided to all
families, including families with single mothers: nationalized medical care,
quality parent/teacher controlled daycare and after-school programs as
part of public education, and subsidies for adequate housing. Ultimately
an approach that emphasizes employment can argue for the provision of
well-paid, useful, and productive work, while showing that the costs are
affordable and the benefits enormous.
At the turn of the century, it may have been progressive to argue for
poor mothers' right to withdraw from wage work. Combining wage work
and domestic work was extremely difficult under any circumstances and
expanding state support for daycare or forcing employers to make conces-
sions to women's family responsibilities was not a possibility. But these
conditions no longer apply.110
To argue that the state should support women to stay home (rather
than to combine work and parenting) concedes ground to the dominant
conservative gender politics. In the current debate over childcare legisla-
tion, for example, conservatives are proposing "wages for housework":
they advocate using tax credits and vouchers to pay women, even women
in "intact" families, to stay home with their children. The Hatch Child-
care Bill would give triple tax exemptions to families for each child cared
for by a parent at home, while funding daycare at a level far below that
proposed by the Democrats.
Poor and working women themselves would prefer to combine work
and parenting. 1 ' Women leaders in the National Welfare Rights Organi-
zation opposed categorizing single mothers along with the aged and dis-
abled as "economically immobile," i.e., unable to be self-supporting.
While arguing for an adequate income for women who chose to work in
the home, these women also argued for jobs, educational opportunity and
childcare for single mothers, and they often challenged male organizers
who gave priority to jobs for unemployed men and who tended to ignore
the childcare issue.11 A renewed poor women's movement is much more
likely to form around demands for jobs and service support than increased
welfare alone.
The growing organization of women workers, and their increasing in-
110. See generally Brenner & Ramas, Rethinking Women's Oppression, 144 NEW LEFT REV. 33
(1984).
111. On poor women's attitudes, see MILWAUKEE NAT'L WELFARE RIGHTS ORG., WELFARE
WOMEN SPEAK OUT (1972); COALITION ON HUMAN NEEDS, HOW THE POOR WOULD REMEDY
POVERTY: INTERVIEW WITH 50 LOW-INCOME PERSONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (July-Aug. 1986).
On working-class women's attitudes, see Feree, Working Class Jobs: Housework and Paid Work as
Sources of Satisfaction, 23 Soc. PROBS. 431 (1976).
112. G. WEST, supra note 62, at 93.
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fluence within the trade union movement, makes possible alliances be-
tween employed and unemployed women and between better-paid work-
ers and the working poor. Such alliances, while not simple, will be easier
to make today than in the past when men dominated trade union politics
and the problems of combining work and family responsibilities were en-
tirely marginal to trade union organizing. As union women mobilize
around demands for federal action to help both two-parent and single-
parent families with childcare, they have the potential to become allies for
women on welfare who also need quality childcare so they can work.113
Indeed, the extension of subsidized childcare would solve one of the pri-
mary difficulties faced by single mothers: income from their low-paid jobs
does not cover the costs of working, especially childcare costs. Similarly,
while the number of working women with health care benefits has grown,
many are without coverage. State legislation requiring employers to pro-
vide medical benefits for all workers, or state subsidization of health in-
surance for all, would also make it much easier for women on welfare to
move into paid work.
A politics that emphasizes combining work and parenting for all fami-
lies can directly challenge the false distinction between "dependent" fami-
lies (those that rely on the state) and "independent" families (those that
rely on their own resources). This distinction has been the foundation of
AFDC policy. While working parents have different needs, almost all
working parents need help from the state. Affluent two-earner families
may be able to generate by themselves the high levels of income and flexi-
ble working conditions necessary to combine successfully waged work,
parenting and caregiving. But most families, even those with two earners,
cannot solve work/family dilemmas alone. Because caregiving and parent-
ing remain primarily a familial, private responsibility rather than a social
and community responsibility, and because men generally earn higher in-
comes than women, the traditional gender division of labor which assigns
caregiving tasks to women continues, even where women work for wages.
Single-earner families, especially those headed by a woman, are especially
disadvantaged. At a minimum, good jobs at a living wage for women as
well as for men, a shorter workday, and publicly funded programs provid-
ing high-quality care are necessary to meet the pressing needs facing the
majority of men and women. 114
113. For example, the Coalition of Labor Union Women's American Family Celebration held a
demonstration in Washington, D.C. on May 14, 1988 which demanded federal action on childcare,
health care, pay equity, and paid parental leave.
114. In recasting the debate on welfare, Wendy Sarvasy similarly argues the need to associate
programs for poor mothers with programs for all families. She calls for revaluing and ultimately
restructuring caretaker work, in which both men and women would be rewarded for performing the
important roles of taking care of other people. Trying to get poor mothers into paid work, she argues,
simply legitimizes the assumption that poor mothers must have a privatized double burden. Instead,
we should recognize that women are providing a socially necessary activity which needs to be re-
warded, not stigmatized. Sarvasy, supra note 16. While I support much of her argument, I remain
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The entry of women into the labor force and the increasing influence of
women trade unionists, the impact of feminism on the perception of
women's family roles, and the increasing organization of professionals and
grass-roots constituencies around family/work issues, make it possible for
the first time since the emergence of industrial capitalism to challenge
women's assignment to unpaid caring work. We can reasonably argue for
households' universal need for social provisions that will help them carry
out their responsibilities for raising children and caring for adults.
concerned that paying women to be full-time caretakers and domestic workers in their own homes,
even reformulated so that it potentially includes men in the role, reinforces conventional ideas about
children's needs, adequate mothering, and women's association with caretaking as well as reinforcing
the belief that privatized care within the family household is necessarily preferable to more socialized
forms.
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